Minnesota Says "Materially Limits" Because the Legislature Struck "Substantially" in 1989 — and the Supreme Court Said That Lowered the Bar

The definition, and the two sentences it is made of

Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 12, in full:

“Disability” means any condition or characteristic that renders a person a disabled person. A disabled person is any person who (1) has a physical, sensory, or mental impairment which materially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; (3) is regarded as having such an impairment; or (4) has an impairment that is episodic or in remission and would materially limit a major life activity when active.

That is the entire definition. There is no list of qualifying conditions, no severity threshold in numbers, and no reference to any agency determination. There is also no definition of the terms it uses: a case-insensitive search of chapter 363A as the Revisor publishes it returns the phrase “major life activit” exactly twice, both inside subdivision 12, and the word “impairment” six times — four inside subdivision 12 and two inside § 363A.50’s definition of auxiliary aids for organ-transplant access. The chapter defines neither term.

Disability is one of the fourteen grounds in § 363A.08, subd. 2, the prohibition that makes it an unfair employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire, to discharge, or to discriminate in the terms of employment. That prohibition has no employer-size floor, because § 363A.03, subd. 16, defines “employer” as “a person who has one or more employees.” The accommodation duty is a different subdivision with a 15-employee threshold, and it has its own page. This page is about the definition that comes first.

One word, changed on purpose, in 1989

The verb is the whole difference between the Minnesota and federal definitions, and the legislature put it there.

Laws 1989, ch. 280, § 1, amended what was then Minn. Stat. § 363.01, subd. 25. On the Revisor’s session-law page the amendment is a single strikeout and a single insertion inside one clause: the struck word is substantially and the inserted word is materially, in the phrase “has a physical, sensory, or mental impairment which … limits one or more major life activities.” Nothing else in the subdivision changed; clauses (2) and (3) carry through unmarked. The subdivision as the act left it read:

A disabled person is any person who (1) has a physical, sensory, or mental impairment which materially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment.

The Minnesota Supreme Court described the change and its effect in a footnote in Sigurdson v. Carl Bolander & Sons, Co., 532 N.W.2d 225, 228 n.3 (Minn. 1995):

The statute originally required the impairment to substantially limit one or more life activities. In 1989, the legislature amended the word substantially to materially, thus lowering the standard in which the impairment impacts on one or more life activities. 1989 Minn.Laws, ch. 280 § 1. This standard now is different from the applicable federal standard.

“Lowering the standard” is the court’s phrase, not a gloss. The federal statute still uses the other word: 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.”

The same 1989 act made a second change that belongs here. Section 2 amended the definition of “qualified disabled person” by adding, as new language, the sentence that assigns the burden:

If a respondent contends that the person is not a qualified disabled person, the burden is on the respondent to prove that it was reasonable to conclude the disabled person, with reasonable accommodation, could not have met the requirements of the job or that the selected person was demonstrably better able to perform the job.

That sentence is still in the statute, at § 363A.03, subd. 36.

What “materially limits” has actually meant

Two Minnesota Supreme Court decisions do most of the work, and they come out opposite ways on similar-looking records.

The claim that failed. In Sigurdson v. Carl Bolander & Sons, a 52-year-old applicant for a truck mechanic job volunteered during his interview that he was an insulin-dependent diabetic who had had seizures, and was not hired. The court framed the question narrowly, at 228:

There is no dispute that diabetes is an impairment, 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35.101 App. A (1994), and that working is a major life activity. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1994). Rather, the issue here is whether diabetes causes a material impairment as required by Minn. Stat. § 363.01, subd. 13(1).

And answered it, at 229:

The evidence indicates that Sigurdson’s ability to work has not been greatly impeded by his diabetes since he has been able to obtain and retain employment for most of his adult years. According to Sigurdson, he has never been discriminated against because of his diabetes. Thus, in light of these facts, Sigurdson’s diabetes has not materially limited his ability to obtain and retain employment, and thus, his failure to obtain one job does not render him disabled.

The diagnosis was conceded. The limitation was not proved. That is the shape of the inquiry.

The claim that survived. In Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortgage Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534 (Minn. 2001), a loan originator with fibromyalgia reported headaches, muscle and joint pain, sleeplessness, and depression, and said the symptoms made it harder to concentrate, learn, and retain information. Her employer argued the symptoms “lack the specificity and severity necessary for a disability.” The supreme court reversed summary judgment against her, and the sentence that explains why is at 544:

While in another case a combination of severe headaches, sleeplessness, and fatigue may not constitute a disability under the MHRA, in this case Hoover has substantiated her allegations with concrete evidence suggesting that the fibromyalgia materially limited her ability to work.

The distinguishing feature was evidence, not diagnosis. The record included a supervisor who had given Hoover a brochure describing a medical program for people with fibromyalgia and who had discussed with a coworker the limiting effect the condition was having on her ability to work. Applying the factors below, the court concluded at 544 that “Hoover has raised a fact question as to whether she is impaired in the major life activity of work.”

The five factors, when work is the activity

Hoover, 632 N.W.2d at 543, states the method:

The degree to which a condition limits one or more major life activities is evaluated based on the plaintiff’s specific circumstances. See State by Cooper v. Hennepin County, 441 N.W.2d 106, 111 (Minn.1989). When, as here, the plaintiff alleges that work is the major life activity in which she is materially impaired, we consider “(a) the number and type of jobs from which the impaired individual is disqualified, (b) the geographic area to which the applicant has reasonable access, (c) the applicant’s own job expectations and training, (d) the criteria or qualifications in use generally, and (e) the types of jobs to which the rejection would apply.”

The source Hoover cites is State ex rel. Cooper v. Hennepin County, 441 N.W.2d 106 (Minn. 1989), which set the factors out at 111 and drew them from a federal district court decision. Read Cooper with its date in mind: it construed the statute before the 1989 amendment took effect and used the old verb, holding at 111 that a detention deputy applicant who “has only been rejected for one specific job” and had not shown he was likely to be rejected for similar jobs “fails to meet the substantially limited standard.”

Bolander then explained exactly how much of Cooper survived the amendment, at 228:

Since our holding in Cooper Minn.Stat. 363.01, subd. 13 has been amended so that the impairment need only materially limit one or more life activities. The factors and considerations are now viewed in a less stringent light, nevertheless, they remain the same.

Same factors, easier standard. That sentence is the reason a pre-1990 disability decision is still usable in Minnesota and is still not a safe guide to the outcome.

The three clauses that do not require a current limitation

Clause (1) is the one everyone argues about. The other three reach people who may not be limited at all.

Clause (2) — a record of such an impairment. A past impairment, documented, is inside the definition on its face.

Clause (3) — regarded as having such an impairment. Bolander, 532 N.W.2d at 228: “Impairments that are not materially limiting but are perceived and treated as such will be deemed to be materially limiting.” The employer’s belief is the operative fact, and whether the belief was correct is not the question.

Clause (4) — episodic or in remission. This is the newest text in the definition. Laws 2024, ch. 105, § 2, struck the “or” at the end of clause (2) and added, as new language, “; or (4) has an impairment that is episodic or in remission and would materially limit a major life activity when active.” Chapter 105 contains no effective-date clause — a case-insensitive search of the act as the Revisor publishes it returns zero occurrences of the word “effective” — and makes no appropriation. Minn. Stat. § 645.02 therefore supplies the date: an act “except one making appropriations” takes effect “on August 1 next following its final enactment,” at 12:01 a.m. The governor signed chapter 105 on May 15, 2024, so clause (4) took effect August 1, 2024.

Clause (4) is the answer to a particular employer argument — that a condition which was not flaring on the day of the decision is not a disability. The clause directs the question to what the impairment does “when active.” Minnesota’s clause tracks the federal rule at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D): “An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”

“Qualified” is a second question, and the burden on it belongs to the employer

Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 36, defines the term the operative provisions actually use:

“Qualified disabled person” means:

(1) with respect to employment, a disabled person who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions required of all applicants for the job in question …

For the purposes of this subdivision, “disability” excludes any condition resulting from alcohol or drug abuse which prevents a person from performing the essential functions of the job in question or constitutes a direct threat to property or the safety of others.

If a respondent contends that the person is not a qualified disabled person, the burden is on the respondent to prove that it was reasonable to conclude the disabled person, with reasonable accommodation, could not have met the requirements of the job or that the selected person was demonstrably better able to perform the job.

The threshold for the employee’s part of it is low. Hoover, 632 N.W.2d at 544: “For the purposes of establishing that she was qualified for the position from which she was dismissed, a plaintiff need only establish that she met the minimum objective qualifications for the job.” In Hoover itself the employer pointed to errors found in a special audit of her loan files; the court held that whether she continued to meet the job’s requirements and whether her files complied “are disputed questions of fact.” Id. at 545.

The alcohol-and-drug clause is narrower than it is usually described. It does not exclude every condition resulting from alcohol or drug abuse. It excludes a condition that “prevents a person from performing the essential functions of the job in question or constitutes a direct threat to property or the safety of others,” and it does so only “[f]or the purposes of this subdivision.”

There is a separate safety defense in § 363A.25, and the statute assigns it: “It is a defense to a complaint or action brought under the employment provisions of this chapter that the person bringing the complaint or action has a disability which in the circumstances and even with reasonable accommodation, as defined in section 363A.08, subdivision 6, poses a serious threat to the health or safety of the disabled person or others. The burden of proving this defense is upon the respondent.” What that defense takes to prove is worked through on the accommodation page.

What the ADA has that Minnesota does not

The 2008 ADA Amendments Act did something Minnesota has never done: it wrote instructions to courts into the definition itself. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 now supplies four things chapter 363A has no counterpart to.

A list of major life activities. § 12102(2)(A): “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” And § 12102(2)(B) adds “the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.”

A definition of “regarded as.” § 12102(3)(A): an individual meets the requirement “if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” With a limit in § 12102(3)(B): the clause “shall not apply to impairments that are transitory and minor. A transitory impairment is an impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.”

A thumb on the scale. § 12102(4)(A): “The definition of disability in this chapter shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.” And § 12102(4)(C): “An impairment that substantially limits one major life activity need not limit other major life activities in order to be considered a disability.”

A mitigating-measures rule. § 12102(4)(E)(i) directs that whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity “shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures” — medication, medical supplies and equipment, prosthetics, hearing aids and cochlear implants, mobility devices, oxygen equipment, assistive technology, reasonable accommodations, and “learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications.” Ordinary eyeglasses and contact lenses are the stated exception, § 12102(4)(E)(ii).

Minnesota’s subdivision 12 contains none of that. A case-insensitive search of chapter 363A as the Revisor publishes it returns zero occurrences of “broad coverage” and zero of “transitory”; the single occurrence of “mitigating” is in § 363A.44, subd. 2, the equal-pay certificate provisions, and has nothing to do with disability. The statute states the four routes and stops. Whether Minnesota’s shorter definition reaches further than the federal one in any particular case is a question about that case; what the texts show is that Minnesota’s verb is the more permissive one and the ADA’s construction rules are the more explicit ones, and those two facts do not cancel out.

Currency

The Revisor currently publishes the 2025 edition of Minnesota Statutes. History lines were read on each section cited: § 363A.03 ends “2023 c 3 s 1; 2023 c 52 art 19 s 46-48; 2024 c 105 s 2-5”; § 363A.08 ends “1Sp2021 c 11 art 3 s 13; 2023 c 52 art 19 s 52-56”; § 363A.25 ends “1998 c 397 art 11 s 3”; § 645.02 shows “1941 c 492 s 2; 1959 c 368 s 4; 1971 c 196 s 1; 1987 c 384 art 1 s 48.”

The Revisor’s table of Minnesota Statutes affected by session laws was queried one exact section at a time. For § 363A.03 the most recent action of any session is Laws 2024, ch. 105 — subdivision 12 amended by § 2, subdivision 13 by § 3, subdivision 18 by § 4, subdivision 29 by § 5, and subdivision 3 repealed by § 20 — and no 2025 or 2026 action is returned. Section 363A.08 returns one 2026 action, to subdivision 4 (Laws 2026, ch. 88, art. 1, § 196), which does not reach subdivision 2 or subdivision 6. Sections 363A.25 and 645.02 return no records at all.

42 U.S.C. § 12102 was retrieved from the Legal Information Institute on September 11, 2026. Its credit line reads “(Pub. L. 101–336, § 3, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 329; Pub. L. 110–325, § 4(a), Sept. 25, 2008, 122 Stat. 3555.)”, and the notes record that the 2008 amendment took effect January 1, 2009.

What this page does not do

It reads a definition and reports what two Minnesota Supreme Court decisions did with it. Whether a particular condition materially limits a particular major life activity is a question about a specific person’s circumstances — Hoover says so in terms, 632 N.W.2d at 543 — and this page does not answer it for anyone.

The duty to accommodate, the 15-employee threshold that duty carries, the interactive process the legislature added in 2021, and the undue-hardship factors are all on reasonable accommodation at work. Harassment because of a disability is the same chapter and a different provision: the 2024 amendment untethered harassment from sex. How any of it is proved is on how a discrimination case is proven, and the one-year clock is on the calendar page.