Nothing on this page is advice about your job, and no article can be. If you want your own facts looked at, a Minnesota employment attorney can do that — and several of the deadlines described on this site are short enough that waiting is itself a decision.
In this guide
- The premise this page corrects
- Two doors, described by their own statutes
- The deferral rule, which is the part that is usually stated backwards
- Where the 300 days comes from
- What the Commission’s regulation says about designating a state agency, and what it does not
- Chapter 363A’s side of the relationship, which is one clause long
- The one thing chapter 363A does make exclusive
- The age statute runs the same structure with its own numbers
- The sequence, stated as the statutes state it
- Currency
- What this page does not do
The premise this page corrects
The sentence a Minnesota employee usually meets is that you file “with the EEOC or the state, and they cross-file it for you.” Two filings, one act, no consequences. That is not what the statutes say, and the places where it breaks are the places where claims die.
What follows is the machinery from the two statutes and the one regulation that describe it. The Minnesota one-year deadline and the routes from a charge into district court are on the calendar page; what the commissioner does with a charge once it is filed is on the MDHR charge page. Neither is repeated here.
Two doors, described by their own statutes
Minnesota. Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 1, opens with a choice and no exhaustion requirement:
Any person aggrieved by a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action as provided in section 363A.33, subdivision 1, or may file a verified charge with the commissioner or the commissioner’s designated agent.
Federal. Title VII runs the other way. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) builds the private action on a charge and a notice: on a dismissal, or where 180 days pass from the filing of the charge “or the expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d), whichever is later,” without a Commission suit or a conciliation agreement to which the aggrieved person is a party, the Commission “shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge.”
Those are two structures, not two doors into one room.
The deferral rule, which is the part that is usually stated backwards
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) does two things in one sentence: it defers to the state agency, and it fixes when a state proceeding is treated as having started.
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (a) by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated, provided that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year after the effective date of such State or local law. If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a State or local authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the appropriate State or local authority.
Subsection (d) is the mirror image for a charge filed by a Commissioner rather than by an aggrieved person: the Commission must notify the state officials first and, on request, afford them “a reasonable time, but not less than sixty days,” to act under state law.
Two features of the subsection reach an ordinary charge. The 60-day period is a bar on filing, framed as “no charge may be filed.” And it is defined by the character of the state law and the state authority — a law “prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged” and an authority empowered “to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings.” Minnesota’s Human Rights Act and its commissioner answer that description on the face of §§ 363A.28 and 363A.29; the statute does not require a list, and it does not name any state.
Where the 300 days comes from
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) sets both figures in one sentence, and the conditional in the middle is the whole point:
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten days thereafter, except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy of such charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local agency.
The claim: "Minnesota is a deferral state, so I automatically get 300 days with the EEOC."
That is not the condition the statute writes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) extends the period to 300 days "in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice." The trigger is the aggrieved person having instituted the state proceeding, not the mere existence of a state agency. The same clause then imposes a second, earlier cutoff that no one repeats: the charge must be filed within 300 days "or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier." A state termination notice that arrives at month five can close the federal window before day 300 does.
The Commission’s own regulation is written on the same assumption and adds the mechanics, though it is a rule about how the Commission processes paper rather than a statute of limitations. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(1) provides that “[c]harges arising in jurisdictions having no FEP agency are filed with the Commission upon receipt” and are timely “if received by the Commission within 180 days from the date of the alleged violation.” Paragraph (a)(2) treats a jurisdiction whose agency lacks jurisdiction over the statutory basis alleged — the regulation’s example is “an agency that does not have enforcement authority over sex discrimination” — as “equivalent to a jurisdiction having no FEP agency,” which puts those charges back on 180 days.
Where an agency does have jurisdiction over the basis alleged, paragraph (a)(4) sets out what happens to the paper. The document “shall be deferred to the appropriate FEP agency,” transmitted by registered mail return receipt requested “or by any other means acceptable to the FEP agency,” and “State or local proceedings are deemed to have commenced on the date such document is transmitted.” The charging party is notified in writing that the document was forwarded. Then the filing date:
Where the document on its face constitutes a charge which is not within a category of charges over which the FEP agency has waived its right to the period of exclusive processing referred to in paragraph (a)(3)(iii) of this section, the Commission shall process the document in accordance with paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this section. The charge shall be deemed to be filed with the Commission upon expiration of 60 (or where appropriate, 120) days after deferral, or upon the termination of FEP agency proceedings, or upon waiver of the FEP agency’s right to exclusively process the charge, whichever is earliest.
And, in the same clause and the parallel clause for a charge presented first to the state agency: “Such filing is timely if effected within 300 days from the date of the alleged violation.” Paragraph (a)(3)(iii) supplies the escape valve that makes the whole arrangement workable — “A FEP agency may waive its right to the period of exclusive processing of charges provided under section 706(c) of title VII with respect to any charge or category of charges” — and where a waiver covers the charge, paragraph (a)(4)(ii)(A) makes it “deemed to be filed with the Commission upon receipt of the document.”
Paragraph (b)(2) covers the reader who went to the state agency first and did not ask for anything federal:
(ii) If the FEP agency proceedings have terminated, the charge may be timely filed with the Commission within 30 days of receipt of notice that the FEP agency proceedings have been terminated or within 300 days from the date of the alleged violation, whichever is earlier.
(iii) If the FEP agency proceedings have not been terminated, the charge may be presented to the Commission within 300 days from the date of the alleged violation.
What the Commission’s regulation says about designating a state agency, and what it does not
29 C.F.R. § 1601.70(a) sets the qualifications:
State and local fair employment practice agencies or authorities which qualify under section 706(c) of title VII and this section shall be designated as “FEP agencies.” The qualifications for designation under section 706(c) are as follows:
(1) That the state or political subdivision has a fair employment practice law which makes unlawful employment practices based upon race; color; religion; sex; national origin; disability; genetic information; or pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
(2) That the State or political subdivision has either established a State or local authority or authorized an existing State or local authority that is empowered with respect to employment practices found to be unlawful, to do one of three things: To grant relief from the practice; to seek relief from the practice; or to institute criminal proceedings with respect to the practice.
Paragraph (b) then removes the need for any paperwork on the state’s side: “if the Commission is aware that an agency or authority meets the above criteria for FEP agency designation, the Commission shall defer charges to such agency or authority even though no request for FEP agency designation has been made.” Paragraph (d) adds that “[w]here both State and local FEP agencies exist, the Commission reserves the right to defer to the State FEP agency only.”
What is not there, and what is. The eCFR structure for title 29, retrieved on September 10, 2026, shows §§ 1601.72 through 1601.74 as a single node labeled “§§ 1601.72-1601.74 [Reserved]” with "reserved": true. No list of designated FEP agencies is printed in part 1601. Section 1601.71(a) instead assigns the list to the agency’s own website: when the Commission determines that an agency meets the § 1601.70 criteria, it “shall so notify the agency by letter and shall notify the public by publication of an updated list of FEP agencies on the Commission’s public website.” This page does not cite that list, and it does not say whether the Minnesota Department of Human Rights is on it. What the statute and the regulation both do independently of any list is describe a state agency by its powers, and the Minnesota commissioner’s powers are written into § 363A.28 and § 363A.29.
Chapter 363A’s side of the relationship, which is one clause long
The full text of chapter 363A as posted by the Revisor was retrieved on September 10, 2026 and searched. “Equal Employment Opportunity” returns zero occurrences. “EEOC” returns zero. “Deferral” returns zero.
“Work sharing” returns one, in Minn. Stat. § 363A.29, subd. 2:
The commissioner shall make a determination of probable cause or no probable cause within one year of the filing of a case in which the time has not been tolled. The amount of time during which a case is involved in significant settlement negotiations, is being investigated by another enforcement agency under a work sharing agreement, or has been referred to mediation or to a local human rights commission for no fault grievance processing is tolled. Tolling of the time during settlement negotiations requires written approval of the charging party or the party’s attorney.
Read what that does and does not do. It assumes a work sharing agreement can exist, and it makes the time a case spends under another agency’s investigation under such an agreement stop the commissioner’s one-year clock. It does not create the agreement, describe its terms, name the other agency, or say that a filing with one office is a filing with the other. That is the entire textual link between chapter 363A and the federal system, in the chapter as posted.
The claim: "The agencies have a work sharing agreement, so filing with one is filing with both and I do not have to think about it."
No provision of chapter 363A retrieved for this page says that. A search of the full posted text of chapter 363A on September 10, 2026 returns one occurrence of "work sharing," in Minn. Stat. § 363A.29, subd. 2, where it functions only as a tolling trigger for the commissioner's one-year probable-cause deadline, and zero occurrences of "Equal Employment Opportunity," "EEOC," and "deferral." The dual-filing mechanics live on the federal side — 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) requires that "a copy of such charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local agency," and 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(4)(i)(B) requires the Commission to transmit a deferred document to the FEP agency and deems state proceedings commenced "on the date such document is transmitted." Which of those steps actually happened to a particular piece of paper, and on what date, is answered by the agencies' own records, and this page cannot answer it.
The one thing chapter 363A does make exclusive
The choice that chapter 363A does foreclose is between the state commissioner and a local human rights commission. Minn. Stat. § 363A.07, subd. 3:
The charging party has the option of filing a charge either with a local commission or the department. Notwithstanding the provisions of any ordinance or resolution to the contrary, a charge may be filed with a local commission within one year after the occurrence of the practice. The exercise of such choice in filing a charge with one agency shall preclude the option of filing the same charge with the other agency.
That sentence is about two Minnesota bodies. It is not addressed to the EEOC, and by its terms it reaches “a local commission or the department.”
Going to court ends the state administrative case. Under § 363A.33, subd. 3, a charging party who sues must send a copy of the summons and complaint to the commissioner, “and upon their receipt the commissioner shall terminate all proceedings in the department relating to the charge,” with no refiling “unless the civil action has been dismissed without prejudice.”
The age statute runs the same structure with its own numbers
The ADEA has its own deferral provision and its own charge deadline, and they are not the Title VII ones.
In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice, no suit may be brought under section 626 of this title before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated: Provided, That such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year after the effective date of such State law.
Note the difference from Title VII: § 2000e-5(c) bars filing a charge for 60 days; § 633(b) bars bringing suit for 60 days. The same subsection carries the same registered-mail commencement rule, framed for a State authority rather than a State or local one.
29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) then sets the charge deadline:
No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Such a charge shall be filed—
(A) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred; or
(B) in a case to which section 633(b) of this title applies, within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, or within 30 days after receipt by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings under State law, whichever is earlier.
And § 626(e) supplies the suit window after the Commission is done: “If a charge filed with the Commission under this chapter is dismissed or the proceedings of the Commission are otherwise terminated by the Commission, the Commission shall notify the person aggrieved. A civil action may be brought under this section by a person defined in section 630(a) of this title against the respondent named in the charge within 90 days after the date of the receipt of such notice.”
The sequence, stated as the statutes state it
| Step | Title VII | Minnesota Human Rights Act |
|---|---|---|
| Is an agency step required before suit? | Yes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) builds the private action on a charge and a notice from the Commission. | No. Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 1: a person “may bring a civil action … or may file a verified charge with the commissioner.” |
| Filing deadline | 180 days after the practice; 300 days where the aggrieved person “has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency,” or 30 days after notice of state termination, “whichever is earlier.” § 2000e-5(e)(1). | One year after the occurrence of the practice, for a civil action, a local-commission charge, or a charge with the commissioner. § 363A.28, subd. 3(a). |
| Waiting period before the charge can be filed | 60 days after state proceedings commence, unless earlier terminated; 120 days during the first year after the state law’s effective date. § 2000e-5(c). | None appears in chapter 363A. |
| What the other agency’s file does to the clock | The Commission must file a copy of the charge with the State or local agency, § 2000e-5(e)(1); the regulation deems state proceedings commenced on transmittal, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(4)(i)(B). | Time under investigation “by another enforcement agency under a work sharing agreement” tolls the commissioner’s one-year probable-cause deadline, § 363A.29, subd. 2. Nothing in the chapter tolls the one-year filing deadline for a federal filing. |
| Getting to court | 90 days after the Commission’s notice. § 2000e-5(f)(1). | Three routes in § 363A.33, subd. 1 — 90 days after a dismissal notice, 90 days after a reaffirmance on reconsideration, or, for a still-pending charge, no earlier than 45 days after filing and then within 90 days of the charging party’s own notice to the commissioner of an intention to sue. |
| Weight given to the other system’s result | “In determining whether reasonable cause exists, the Commission shall accord substantial weight to final findings and orders made by State or local authorities in proceedings commenced under State or local law pursuant to the requirements of subsections (c) and (d).” § 2000e-5(b). | A search of the full posted text of chapter 363A for “weight,” “substantial weight,” and “final findings” returns zero occurrences of each. |
The last row is worth reading twice. The obligation to give substantial weight runs one direction, from the Commission toward the state agency’s final findings, and it is an obligation about the reasonable-cause determination rather than about anything a court does.
Currency
Minnesota. The Revisor publishes the 2025 Minnesota Statutes. History lines read September 10, 2026: § 363A.28 ends at “1Sp2021 c 11 art 3 s 14,15; 2024 c 105 s 13”; § 363A.07 at “2023 c 52 art 19 s 51; 2024 c 105 s 8”; § 363A.33 at “1Sp2021 c 11 art 3 s 17; 2024 c 105 s 16-19.” Table 2 was queried one exact section at a time for §§ 363A.07, 363A.28, 363A.29, and 363A.33, for 2025 and 2026. One 2026 record appears: § 363A.29, subd. 1, amended by Laws 2026, ch. 97, art. 13, § 1. The Revisor’s posted text of that subdivision therefore lags the session law. This page does not quote or rely on § 363A.29, subd. 1 — it quotes subdivision 2, whose most recent Table 2 record is Laws 2024, ch. 105, § 15. The 2026 amendment to subdivision 1 and its effective date are treated on the forum map and the MDHR charge page. Section 363A.07 returns a 2026 record for subdivision 4 (Laws 2026, ch. 88, art. 1, § 195, technical corrections) and none for subdivision 3, which is the subdivision quoted here. Sections 363A.28 and 363A.33 return no 2025 or 2026 record.
Federal. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, 29 U.S.C. § 626, and 29 U.S.C. § 633 were retrieved from the Legal Information Institute on September 10, 2026. Section 633 carries a single credit, “Pub. L. 90-202, § 14, Dec. 15, 1967, 81 Stat. 607,” with a note recording the 1978 transfer of functions to the Commission.
Regulations. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.13, 1601.70, and 1601.71 were retrieved from the electronic Code of Federal Regulations through the versioner for title 29 at the title’s most recent issue date, 2026-08-31; the eCFR reports title 29 as amended through 2026-08-31 and up to date as of 2026-09-08. Section 1601.13’s source note reads “[46 FR 43039, Aug. 26, 1981, as amended at 46 FR 48189, Oct. 1, 1981; 52 FR 10224, Mar. 31, 1987; 52 FR 18354, May 15, 1987; 56 FR 9624, Mar. 7, 1991; 74 FR 63982, Dec. 7, 2009; 85 FR 65217, Oct. 15, 2020; 89 FR 11169, Feb. 14, 2024].” Section 1601.71’s source note reads “[45 FR 33606, May 20, 1980, as amended at 47 FR 53733, Nov. 29, 1982. Redesignated at 56 FR 9625, Mar. 7, 1991; 60 FR 46220, Sept. 6, 1995; 85 FR 65219, Oct. 15, 2020; 91 FR 43540, July 16, 2026]” — the paragraph quoted above carries a 2026 amendment. The structure for part 1601 shows §§ 1601.72 to 1601.74 reserved. No mirror of the CFR was used, and nothing on this page came from an agency FAQ, fact sheet, or portal.
What this page does not do
It describes how two filing systems are written to interact. It does not tell you what happened to your paperwork, which is the only question that decides a dual-filing dispute — whether a document was transmitted, on what date, under what agreement, and what each agency recorded. Those facts come from the agencies in writing. Nothing here calculates a deadline for a specific occurrence date; the numbers themselves are collected in the deadline table, and the Minnesota one-year period and its two statutory suspensions are on the calendar page.
Common questions
- Do I have to file with both the EEOC and the Minnesota Department of Human Rights?
- Neither statute says you do. Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 1, gives a choice at the front end: an aggrieved person 'may bring a civil action as provided in section 363A.33, subdivision 1, or may file a verified charge with the commissioner.' Title VII is built the other way — 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) ties the private federal action to a charge and a notice from the Commission. The two filings preserve two different claims under two different statutes with two different deadlines, and no provision of chapter 363A retrieved for this page makes a filing with one agency a filing with the other.
- Why is the EEOC deadline 300 days in Minnesota instead of 180?
- Because of what you did, not because of where you live. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) sets the general period at 180 days and extends it to 300 only 'in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof' — and even then the charge must be filed within 300 days 'or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier.' The statute conditions the longer window on the state proceeding having been instituted.
- Can the EEOC take my charge right away if Minnesota has its own agency?
- Not for the first 60 days after state proceedings commence, on the statute's terms. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) provides that where a State has a law prohibiting the practice and an authority empowered to grant or seek relief, 'no charge may be filed under subsection (a) by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated.' The same subsection also supplies a commencement rule: where a State imposes any requirement beyond a written and signed statement of facts, the proceeding 'shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the appropriate State or local authority.'
- How long do I have to sue after the EEOC issues a right-to-sue notice?
- Ninety days, and the notice is what starts it. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), where the Commission dismisses a charge, or where 180 days pass from the filing of the charge or the expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) without a civil action or a conciliation agreement to which the aggrieved person is a party, the Commission 'shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge.' That is the federal clock. The Minnesota routes into district court are separate, and they run on their own numbers under Minn. Stat. § 363A.33, subd. 1.
- Does chapter 363A say anything about the EEOC?
- The full text of chapter 363A as posted by the Revisor was retrieved on September 10, 2026 and searched. 'Equal Employment Opportunity' returns zero occurrences and 'EEOC' returns zero. The phrase 'work sharing agreement' appears once, in Minn. Stat. § 363A.29, subd. 2, and only as one of three things that tolls the commissioner's one-year probable-cause period: 'The amount of time during which a case is involved in significant settlement negotiations, is being investigated by another enforcement agency under a work sharing agreement, or has been referred to mediation or to a local human rights commission for no fault grievance processing is tolled.' The chapter assumes such an agreement can exist. It does not create one, describe one, or require one.
Sources checked September 10, 2026. Citations independently verified against the primary source September 10, 2026.
- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 — Enforcement provisions (Cornell Legal Information Institute)
- 29 U.S.C. § 626 — ADEA enforcement; charge filing (Cornell Legal Information Institute)
- 29 U.S.C. § 633 — Federal-State relationship (Age Discrimination in Employment Act) (Cornell Legal Information Institute)
- 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 — Filing; deferrals to State and local agencies (Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, title 29 as of 2026-09-08)
- 29 C.F.R. § 1601.70 — FEP agency qualifications (Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, title 29 as of 2026-09-08)
- 29 C.F.R. § 1601.71 — FEP agency notification (Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, title 29 as of 2026-09-08)
- Minn. Stat. § 363A.28 — Grievances (Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes)
- Minn. Stat. § 363A.29 — Conduct of hearings; orders (Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes)
- Minn. Stat. § 363A.07 — Local commissions (Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes)
- Minn. Stat. § 363A.33 — Civil actions (Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes)
- Minnesota Statutes affected by session laws, Table 2 (queried per exact section for 2025 and 2026)