Nothing on this page is advice about your job, and no article can be. If you want your own facts looked at, a Minnesota employment attorney can do that — and several of the deadlines described on this site are short enough that waiting is itself a decision.
In this guide
What this page covers, and what it does not
The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990 added subsection (f) to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s enforcement section, and the result is the most prescriptive waiver statute an American employee is likely to encounter. It governs one thing: a waiver of a claim under the ADEA. It says nothing about a release of a Minnesota Human Rights Act claim, a wage claim, or a contract claim, and it is not a general rule for severance agreements. Minnesota’s own 15-day rescission right and the claims a private release cannot reach at all are on the severance release page, and this page does not repeat them.
Two threshold facts about the statute itself, because subsection (f) protects a claim that has to exist first. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a): “The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age.” And 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) defines “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,” and includes a State or political subdivision while excluding the United States and wholly owned government corporations.
The eight requirements, quoted
29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) opens with the rule and then the list:
An individual may not waive any right or claim under this chapter unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary. Except as provided in paragraph (2), a waiver may not be considered knowing and voluntary unless at a minimum—
Eight subparagraphs follow, lettered (A) through (H). “At a minimum” is doing work: meeting all eight does not conclusively establish a knowing and voluntary waiver, and the regulation says so — 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(a)(3) provides that “[o]ther facts and circumstances may bear on the question of whether the waiver is knowing and voluntary, as, for example, if there is a material mistake, omission, or misstatement in the information furnished by the employer to an employee in connection with the waiver.”
(A) Written to be understood.
the waiver is part of an agreement between the individual and the employer that is written in a manner calculated to be understood by such individual, or by the average individual eligible to participate;
The regulation puts content into that. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(b)(2): “The entire waiver agreement must be in writing.” Paragraph (b)(3): agreements “must be drafted in plain language geared to the level of understanding of the individual party to the agreement or individuals eligible to participate,” which “usually will require the limitation or elimination of technical jargon and of long, complex sentences.” Paragraph (b)(4): the agreement “must not have the effect of misleading, misinforming, or failing to inform participants and affected individuals,” and “[a]ny advantages or disadvantages described shall be presented without either exaggerating the benefits or minimizing the limitations.”
(B) Names the statute.
the waiver specifically refers to rights or claims arising under this chapter;
29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(b)(6): “the waiver agreement must refer to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) by name in connection with the waiver.” A general release of “all claims” that never names the ADEA does not satisfy subparagraph (B) on the regulation’s reading.
(C) No future claims.
the individual does not waive rights or claims that may arise after the date the waiver is executed;
29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(c)(2) draws one line inside that: the prohibition does not bar, “in a waiver that otherwise is consistent with statutory requirements, the enforcement of agreements to perform future employment-related actions such as the employee’s agreement to retire or otherwise terminate employment at a future date.”
(D) Consideration you were not already owed.
the individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for consideration in addition to anything of value to which the individual already is entitled;
29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(d)(2): “‘Consideration in addition’ means anything of value in addition to that to which the individual is already entitled in the absence of a waiver.” Paragraph (d)(3) closes the obvious workaround: if a benefit “was eliminated in contravention of law or contract, express or implied, the subsequent offer of such benefit or thing of value in connection with a waiver will not constitute ‘consideration’ for purposes of section 7(f)(1) of the ADEA.” Paragraph (d)(4) adds that an employer is not required to give a person 40 or older more consideration than a person under 40 “solely because of that person’s membership in the protected class.”
(E) The agreement must say in writing that the individual should consult a lawyer before signing.
the individual is advised in writing to consult with an attorney prior to executing the agreement;
(F) Twenty-one days, or forty-five.
(i) the individual is given a period of at least 21 days within which to consider the agreement; or (ii) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other employment termination program offered to a group or class of employees, the individual is given a period of at least 45 days within which to consider the agreement;
The regulation supplies the start date and the restart rule. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(e)(4): “The 21 or 45 day period runs from the date of the employer’s final offer. Material changes to the final offer restart the running of the 21 or 45 day period; changes made to the final offer that are not material do not restart the running of the 21 or 45 day period. The parties may agree that changes, whether material or immaterial, do not restart the running of the 21 or 45 day period.” And paragraph (e)(3) settles which programs count: “The term ‘exit incentive or other employment termination program’ includes both voluntary and involuntary programs.”
(G) Seven days to revoke, and it is not effective until they run.
the agreement provides that for a period of at least 7 days following the execution of such agreement, the individual may revoke the agreement, and the agreement shall not become effective or enforceable until the revocation period has expired;
29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(e)(5) is one sentence: “The 7 day revocation period cannot be shortened by the parties, by agreement or otherwise.”
(H) The group disclosure.
if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other employment termination program offered to a group or class of employees, the employer (at the commencement of the period specified in subparagraph (F)) informs the individual in writing in a manner calculated to be understood by the average individual eligible to participate, as to—
(i) any class, unit, or group of individuals covered by such program, any eligibility factors for such program, and any time limits applicable to such program; and
(ii) the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or selected for the program, and the ages of all individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit who are not eligible or selected for the program.
The claim: "The release says it covers all claims, so my age claim is gone."
A general release does not satisfy the age statute, and the statute says what does. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(B) requires that "the waiver specifically refers to rights or claims arising under this chapter," and 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(b)(6) reads that as requiring the agreement to "refer to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) by name in connection with the waiver." Seven other conditions in § 626(f)(1) sit beside it, and § 626(f)(1) itself says a waiver "may not be considered knowing and voluntary unless at a minimum" all of them are met. Under § 626(f)(3), "the party asserting the validity of a waiver shall have the burden of proving in a court of competent jurisdiction that a waiver was knowing and voluntary." Whether any particular document meets the list is a question about that document, and this page does not answer it.
The “decisional unit,” which is where the (H) disclosure is usually fought
Subparagraph (H) requires a list of job titles and ages for a “class, unit, or group” and a “job classification or organizational unit,” and the statute does not define either phrase. The regulation does, with a term of its own. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(3)(i)(B):
A “decisional unit” is that portion of the employer’s organizational structure from which the employer chose the persons who would be offered consideration for the signing of a waiver and those who would not be offered consideration for the signing of a waiver.
Four rules follow that are worth knowing before reading a disclosure sheet.
It is normally the facility, and sometimes less. Paragraph (f)(3)(ii)(B): “as the decisional unit is typically no broader than the facility, in general the disclosure need be no broader than the facility.” Paragraph (f)(3)(ii)(D): “if an employer seeks to terminate employees by exclusively considering a particular portion or subgroup of its operations at a specific facility, then that subgroup or portion of the workforce at that facility will be considered the decisional unit.”
Comparing facilities widens it. Paragraph (f)(3)(ii)(E): where the employer “analyzes its operations at several facilities, specifically considers and compares ages, seniority rosters, or similar factors at differing facilities, and determines to focus its workforce reduction at a particular facility, then by the nature of that employer’s decision-making process the decisional unit would include all considered facilities and not just the facility selected for the reductions.”
Higher-level review usually does not. Paragraph (f)(3)(vi)(A): “higher level review of termination decisions generally will not change the size of the decisional unit unless the reviewing process alters its scope,” and “review by the Human Resources Department to monitor compliance with discrimination laws does not affect the decisional unit.” Paragraph (f)(3)(vi)(B) states the exception: if the reviewing manager “determines that persons in other facilities should also be considered for termination, the decisional unit becomes the population of all facilities considered.”
The disclosure covers the whole unit, not just the people cut. Paragraph (f)(4)(v): “If the terminees are selected from a subset of a decisional unit, the employer must still disclose information for the entire population of the decisional unit,” with the regulation’s own example — a 10 percent reduction in an accounting department drawn from the bottom third by performance still requires disclosure “for all employees in the Accounting Department, even those who are the highest rated.”
Two mechanical rules sit in paragraph (f)(4). Ages are individual: “Information regarding ages should be broken down according to the age of each person eligible or selected for the program and each person not eligible or selected for the program. The use of age bands broader than one year (such as ‘age 20-30’) does not satisfy this requirement.” And a mixed disclosure has to be sorted: “If an employer in its disclosure combines information concerning both voluntary and involuntary terminations, the employer shall present the information in a manner that distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary terminations.”
Paragraph (f)(3)(vii) is a limit on all of it, and it belongs here rather than in a footnote: “This regulatory section is limited to the requirements of section 7(f)(1)(H) and is not intended to affect the scope of discovery or of substantive proceedings in the processing of charges of violation of the ADEA or in litigation involving such charges.”
The different list for settling a charge or a lawsuit
A release signed to settle an age claim that has already been filed runs on a shorter list. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(2):
A waiver in settlement of a charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or an action filed in court by the individual or the individual’s representative, alleging age discrimination of a kind prohibited under section 623 or 633a of this title may not be considered knowing and voluntary unless at a minimum—
(A) subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph (1) have been met; and
(B) the individual is given a reasonable period of time within which to consider the settlement agreement.
The fixed windows in (F), (G), and (H) do not apply to that document. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(g)(4) defines the substitute: “reasonable under all the circumstances, including whether the individual is represented by counsel or has the assistance of counsel.” Paragraph (g)(5) adds a safe harbor — an agreement that gives the § 626(f)(1) periods anyway “will be considered ‘reasonable’ for purposes of section 7(f)(2)(B).” And paragraph (g)(6) removes an assumption: such an agreement “does not require the participation or supervision of EEOC.”
The burden, and what happens to the money
The burden. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(3):
In any dispute that may arise over whether any of the requirements, conditions, and circumstances set forth in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), or (H) of paragraph (1), or subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2), have been met, the party asserting the validity of a waiver shall have the burden of proving in a court of competent jurisdiction that a waiver was knowing and voluntary pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2).
29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(h) restates it in the same terms.
The money. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.23(a) removes the tender-back precondition:
An individual alleging that a waiver agreement, covenant not to sue, or other equivalent arrangement was not knowing and voluntary under the ADEA is not required to tender back the consideration given for that agreement before filing either a lawsuit or a charge of discrimination with EEOC or any state or local fair employment practices agency acting as an EEOC referral agency for purposes of filing the charge with EEOC. Retention of consideration does not foreclose a challenge to any waiver agreement, covenant not to sue, or other equivalent arrangement; nor does the retention constitute the ratification of any waiver agreement, covenant not to sue, or other equivalent arrangement.
Paragraph (b) forbids the contractual workarounds:
No ADEA waiver agreement, covenant not to sue, or other equivalent arrangement may impose any condition precedent, any penalty, or any other limitation adversely affecting any individual’s right to challenge the agreement. This prohibition includes, but is not limited to, provisions requiring employees to tender back consideration received, and provisions allowing employers to recover attorneys’ fees and/or damages because of the filing of an ADEA suit. This rule is not intended to preclude employers from recovering attorneys’ fees or costs specifically authorized under federal law.
Paragraph (c) is where the money is finally accounted for, and it is not a windfall rule. Where an employee successfully challenges the waiver “and prevails on the merits of an ADEA claim, courts have the discretion to determine whether an employer is entitled to restitution, recoupment or setoff … against the employee’s monetary award,” and “A reduction never can exceed the amount recovered by the employee, or the consideration the employee received for signing the waiver agreement, covenant not to sue, or other equivalent arrangement, whichever is less.” Paragraph (c)(2) requires any reduction in a multi-plaintiff case to be applied plaintiff by plaintiff: “No individual’s award can be reduced based on the consideration received by any other person.” And paragraph (d) keeps the employer’s side of the bargain running: “No employer may abrogate its duties to any signatory under a waiver agreement, covenant not to sue, or other equivalent arrangement, even if one or more of the signatories or the EEOC successfully challenges the validity of that agreement under the ADEA.”
The claim: "I cashed the severance check, so I ratified the release and it is too late to argue about it."
The regulation says the opposite in terms. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.23(a) provides that an individual challenging an ADEA waiver as not knowing and voluntary "is not required to tender back the consideration given for that agreement before filing either a lawsuit or a charge of discrimination with EEOC," and that "[r]etention of consideration does not foreclose a challenge to any waiver agreement, covenant not to sue, or other equivalent arrangement; nor does the retention constitute the ratification" of it. Paragraph (b) separately bars any agreement from imposing "any condition precedent, any penalty, or any other limitation adversely affecting any individual's right to challenge the agreement," and names tender-back clauses and employer fee-recovery clauses as examples. What the money is not is free: under paragraph (c)(1) a court that reaches the merits may order a reduction against a monetary award, capped at the lesser of the recovery or the consideration received.
What no waiver can touch
29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(4), in full:
No waiver agreement may affect the Commission’s rights and responsibilities to enforce this chapter. No waiver may be used to justify interfering with the protected right of an employee to file a charge or participate in an investigation or proceeding conducted by the Commission.
29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(i)(2) and (i)(3) convert that into drafting prohibitions: no waiver agreement may include a provision prohibiting an individual from “[f]iling a charge or complaint, including a challenge to the validity of the waiver agreement, with EEOC” or from “[p]articipating in any investigation or proceeding conducted by EEOC,” and none may impose “any condition precedent, any penalty, or any other limitation adversely affecting” either of those rights.
Two scope notes on that regulation. It reaches public employment: 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(a)(4) provides that “[t]he rules in this section apply to all waivers of ADEA rights and claims, regardless of whether the employee is employed in the private or public sector, including employment by the United States Government.” And it has a date: paragraph (j)(1) sets the section’s effective date as July 6, 1998, paragraph (j)(2) applies it “to waivers offered by employers on or after” that date, and paragraph (j)(3) provides that “[n]o inference is to be drawn from this section regarding the validity of waivers offered prior to the effective date.”
Currency
The statute. 29 U.S.C. §§ 626, 630, and 631 were retrieved from the Legal Information Institute on September 10, 2026. Section 626’s credit line ends “Pub. L. 111-2, § 4, Jan. 29, 2009, 123 Stat. 6,” and the amendment note records that subsection (f) was added by Pub. L. 101-433, title II, § 201, Oct. 16, 1990 — the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act.
The regulations. Both were retrieved from the electronic Code of Federal Regulations on September 10, 2026, through the eCFR versioner for title 29 at the title’s most recent issue date, 2026-08-31; the API reports title 29 as “latest_amended_on 2026-08-31” and “up_to_date_as_of 2026-09-08.” The eCFR structure for title 29 lists part 1625 as present and not reserved, with eighteen sections — 1625.1 through 1625.12, 1625.21, 1625.22, 1625.23, 1625.30, 1625.31, and 1625.32 — none of them reserved. Section 1625.22 carries the source note “[63 FR 30628, June 5, 1998, as amended at 79 FR 13547, Mar. 11, 2014]”; § 1625.23 carries “[65 FR 77446, Dec. 11, 2000].” No secondary mirror of the CFR was used, and no agency guidance document, fact sheet, or FAQ was consulted for any statement on this page.
What this page does not do
It reads a waiver statute and its regulation and reports what they require. It does not read your agreement, count your days, or say whether a particular release is enforceable — § 626(f)(1) says a waiver is not knowing and voluntary “unless at a minimum” the eight conditions are met, which means clearing the list is a floor and not a verdict. Nothing here decides a Minnesota Human Rights Act claim: that release runs on Minn. Stat. § 363A.31 and its own 15-day window, set out on the severance release page. The federal charge deadlines that a preserved age claim still has to meet are on the calendar page and the deadline table.
Common questions
- How many days do I get to consider a severance agreement that releases an age claim?
- Twenty-one days, or forty-five if it is part of a group program. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(F) provides that a waiver is not knowing and voluntary unless, at a minimum, '(i) the individual is given a period of at least 21 days within which to consider the agreement; or (ii) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other employment termination program offered to a group or class of employees, the individual is given a period of at least 45 days within which to consider the agreement.' 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(e)(4) adds that the period 'runs from the date of the employer's final offer' and that material changes to the final offer restart it, though the parties may agree that changes do not restart it. Those windows apply to the age claim. They are not a general rule for every severance agreement.
- Can I sign an ADEA release early and give up the 21 days?
- Yes, but not the seven-day revocation period. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(e)(6) provides that an employee 'may sign a release prior to the end of the 21 or 45 day time period, thereby commencing the mandatory 7 day revocation period,' so long as that decision is knowing and voluntary and 'is not induced by the employer through fraud, misrepresentation, a threat to withdraw or alter the offer prior to the expiration of the 21 or 45 day time period, or by providing different terms to employees who sign the release prior to the expiration of such time period.' Paragraph (e)(5) is categorical about the other window: 'The 7 day revocation period cannot be shortened by the parties, by agreement or otherwise.'
- Do I have to give the severance money back before I can challenge the release?
- Not as to an ADEA claim. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.23(a) provides that an individual alleging a waiver was not knowing and voluntary under the ADEA 'is not required to tender back the consideration given for that agreement before filing either a lawsuit or a charge of discrimination with EEOC,' and that '[r]etention of consideration does not foreclose a challenge to any waiver agreement, covenant not to sue, or other equivalent arrangement; nor does the retention constitute the ratification' of it. Paragraph (c)(1) then says what can happen at the end: where an employee successfully challenges the waiver and prevails on the merits, courts have discretion to award the employer a reduction against the employee's monetary award, and 'A reduction never can exceed the amount recovered by the employee, or the consideration the employee received for signing the waiver agreement, covenant not to sue, or other equivalent arrangement, whichever is less.'
- What does an employer have to disclose in a layoff if it wants the age releases to hold?
- Two categories of information, in writing, at the start of the consideration period. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(H) requires the employer to inform the individual 'in a manner calculated to be understood by the average individual eligible to participate' as to '(i) any class, unit, or group of individuals covered by such program, any eligibility factors for such program, and any time limits applicable to such program; and (ii) the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or selected for the program, and the ages of all individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit who are not eligible or selected for the program.' 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(f)(4)(ii) adds that ages must be broken down person by person and that 'The use of age bands broader than one year (such as "age 20-30") does not satisfy this requirement.' The scope of the group is set by the 'decisional unit,' defined in § 1625.22(f)(3)(i)(B).
- Who has to prove a severance release is valid?
- The employer, or whoever is relying on the release. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(3) provides that in any dispute over whether the listed requirements have been met, 'the party asserting the validity of a waiver shall have the burden of proving in a court of competent jurisdiction that a waiver was knowing and voluntary pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2).' 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22(h) repeats that allocation. The statute puts the proof on the side that drafted the document.
Sources checked September 10, 2026. Citations independently verified against the primary source September 10, 2026.
- 29 U.S.C. § 626 — Recordkeeping, investigation, and enforcement; waiver (Cornell Legal Information Institute)
- 29 U.S.C. § 630 — Definitions (Age Discrimination in Employment Act) (Cornell Legal Information Institute)
- 29 U.S.C. § 631 — Age limits (Cornell Legal Information Institute)
- 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22 — Waivers of rights and claims under the ADEA (Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, title 29 as of 2026-09-08)
- 29 C.F.R. § 1625.23 — Waivers of rights and claims: Tender back of consideration (Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, title 29 as of 2026-09-08)